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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on April 3, 1992. The 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiff 
agreed to have its materials ready for shipment no later than July 
22, 1989? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot 
be set aside on appeal unless they are "clearly erroneous." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a). The evidence is evaluated in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party. Higains v. City of Fillmore, 
639 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1981). When the evidence is in conflict, 
the appellate court presumes that the trial court relied on the 
evidence supporting its findings. i£. The appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then show 
that# despite this evidence, the findings are so lacking in support 
that they are "against the clear weight of the evidence" or leave 
the appellate court with "a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 
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761 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiff 
breached its agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment no 
later than July 22, 1989, and that the defendant was injured by the 
plaintiff's untimely delivery? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see 
also supra issue 1, "Standard of Review." 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that the defendant 
made reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see 
also supra issue l, "Standard of Review." 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that the defendant 
was entitled to an offset for overtime it had paid? 
Standard of Review: Whether or not the defendant was entitled 
to an offset is a mixed question of law and fact. To the extent 
the trial court's ruling is based on its construction of the 
applicable statutes, it is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Forbes v. 
St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). However, to 
the extent it is based on the court's findings of fact, it will not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
See also Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987) (if the 
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trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the 
appellate court will merely determine whether those findings 
justify the trial court's legal conclusions); LaGrand Steel Prods. 
Co. v, A.S.C. Constructors. Inc.f 702 P.2d 855, 856 (Idaho Ct. 
App.) (when faced with mixed questions of law and fact, the 
appellate court defers to facts found on substantial evidence but 
freely reviews the application of the law to the facts), review 
denied. 776 P.2d 828 (Idaho 1985). Moreover, the appellate court 
will not reverse a judgment based on a trial court's error unless 
the error was substantial and prejudicial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
See also Ashton, 733 P.2d at 154 (appellant has the burden of 
showing that the trial court's error was substantial and 
prejudicial). 
5. Did the plaintiff properly raise its claim that the 
defendant caused the untimely delivery? 
Standard of Review; Whether an issue is properly before the 
court on appeal depends on whether or not it was raised "to a level 
of consciousness" such that the trial court had an opportunity to 
make findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the 
issue. See LeBaron & Assocs.. Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.r 823 
P.2d 479, 483 & n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
6. Did the defendant's actions excuse the plaintiff's 
untimely delivery? 
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Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). If 
the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, the appellate 
court will merely determine whether those findings justify the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Sections 70A-2-714, -715 and -717 of the Utah Code may be 
determinative of the fourth issue. Section 70A-2-714 states, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given 
notification [of any breach] . . . he may recover as 
damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss 
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the 
seller's breach as determined in any manner which is 
reasonable. 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and 
consequential damages under the next section may also be 
recovered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-714 (1990). 
Section 70A-2-715 states: 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's 
breach include expenses reasonably incurred in 
inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody 
of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable 
charges, expenses or commissions in connection with 
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident 
to the delay or other breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the 
seller's breach include 
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(a) any loss resulting from general or 
particular requirements and needs of which the 
seller at the time of contracting had reason 
to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property 
proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty. 
I£. § 70A-2-715. 
Section 70A-2-717 states: 
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention 
to do so may deduct all or any part of the damages 
resulting from any breach of the contract from any part 
of the price still due under the same contract. 
Id. § 70A-2-717. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The plaintiff and appellant, Ohline Corporation, brought this 
action claiming that the defendant, Granite Mill, owed it money for 
goods that Ohline had sold to Granite Mill. Record ("R.") at 2. 
Granite Mill acknowledged that it received the goods but claimed it 
was entitled to an offset in the amount of the unpaid purchase 
price because Ohline had breached the parties' contract by 
delivering the goods late. See id. at 26-28. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
The matter was tried to the court on September 20, 1991. At 
the conclusion of the trial, the court stated on the record its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. at 75-84. The court 
- 5 -
then entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, id, 
at 58-64 (see Addendum)
 f in which it concluded that Ohline had 
agreed to have the materials it sold to Granite Mill ready for 
shipment no later than July 22, 1989, that Ohline had breached this 
agreement and that its breach had damaged Granite Mill in the 
amount of $9,405, an amount equal to or in excess of all amounts 
Granite Mill otherwise would have owed Ohline• Based on its 
findings and conclusions, the court entered a judgment in favor of 
Granite Mill and against Ohline. Xd. at 66-67. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In April 1989 Granite Mill entered into a contract with the 
Las Vegas Hilton Corporation for the remodeling of certain suites 
in the Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. The contract required 
that the work be completed on or before August 4, 1989. R. at 59 
f 2, 141-44; ex. 19-D. The suites had been rented beginning on 
August 4, 1989, and if Granite Mill did not complete the job by 
that date, it would have to pay for the suites until they were 
available. R. at 144. 
Granite Mill negotiated with Ohline to manufacture the 
shutters for the remodeling project. A specific and firm delivery 
schedule was very important to Granite Mill because the entire 
project was to take only a little more than three months and there 
were substantial liquidated damages if Granite Mill did not 
complete the work on time. Granite Mill communicated the 
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importance of the delivery date to Ohline during its negotiations 
with Ohline. Id. at 144-46. On May 5, 1989, Granite Mill 
submitted to Ohline Purchase Order No. 2903 for 288 shutters. !£. 
at 95; ex. 1-P. On May 10, 1989, Granite Mill cancelled the order 
until credit and payment terms could be resolved. R. at 95; ex. 1-
P. On May 15, 1989, Chuck Pace, Ohline7s national contract sales 
manager who had negotiated the purchase order, see R. at 93 & 113-
14, told Wayne Hickenlooper, Granite Mill's vice-president for 
sales, that the shutters would be ready for shipment by the third 
week in July at the latest and hopefully "mid month." I£. at 111, 
119, 132, 138-39; ex. 2-P. In reliance on this agreement, on May 
17, 1989, Granite Mill reinstated the order and submitted a check 
for the required deposit. R. at 147-48, 150; exs. 2-P, 3-P & 4-P. 
The purchase order had originally specified that the shutters would 
"be ready for pickup 7-1-89." See ex. 1-P. After the order was 
reinstated, Chuck Pace changed the date on the purchase order to 
"Mid July." See ex. 3-P; R. at 115 & 119. 
On June 6, 1989, Granite Mill faxed to Ohline the final 
measurements, and Ohline began production of the shutters. See R. 
at 102; ex. 6-P. Ohline never asked to change the delivery date, 
and no change in the delivery date was ever made. See R. at 61 J 
10. 
On Saturday, July 22, 1989, Chuck Pace made the first delivery 
of shutters to the job site. He drove a pickup truck carrying some 
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86 or 87 shutters from Ohline's office in Gardena, California, to 
Las Vegas, Nevada, arriving after 4:00 p.m. R. at 103, 128 & 181. 
The balance of the order was shipped with a commercial shipper in 
two shipments. Id. at 104. Thirty-three units were shipped on 
Tuesday, July 25, and sixty-eight units were shipped on Wednesday, 
July 26.x Exs. 7-P & 8-P. Granite Mill did not receive all of the 
shutters until the afternoon of Friday, July 28. R. at 176. 
If all the shutters had been ready for shipment by July 22, as 
agreed, they could have been installed by August 4 without using 
any overtime. See id. at 183-85, 62 f 13. Instead, as a result of 
the late shipments, Granite Mill had to work 435 hours of overtime 
so that it could finish installing the shutters by August 4. Id. 
at 196 & 207; ex. 16-D. It had to pay $9,405 above its regular 
hourly rates for this overtime work. Ex. 16-D; R. at 153-54, 167-
68. The shutters were installed by noon on August 4, 1989. R. at 
156. Granite Mill has paid the contract price for the shutters, 
less $9,405. Id. at 214A.2 
1
 One unit consisted of two or possibly three panels. R. 
at 105. 
2
 Some of the pages in the trial transcript, R. 86-231, 
were not numbered as part of the record on appeal. Unnumbered 
pages will be referred to by the record number of the preceding 
page and the letter &. 
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SqtWARY QF ARgUMEflT 
Ohline has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, so it is precluded from challenging those 
findings on appeal* Nevertheless, the trial court's findings that 
Ohline was aware of Granite Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline; that 
Ohline was aware of the importance of a specific and firm delivery 
schedule; that Ohline agreed to have the shutters ready for 
shipment by July 22, 1989, at the latest; that the parties never 
agreed to a later delivery date; that Ohline breached its 
agreement; that, as a result, Granite Mill was injured in the 
amount of $9,405 and that Granite Mill took reasonable steps to 
mitigate its damages were all supported by substantial evidence and 
support the trial court's legal conclusion that Granite Mill was 
entitled to an offset in the amount of $9,405. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OHLINE'S CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL 
FINPINQS MUST FAIL SECAysg OHLINE HAS NOT M^RSHAkSD 
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS. 
Ohline claims that the trial court erred in finding that it 
was aware of Granite Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline for completing 
the work on the Las Vegas Hilton, that Ohline agreed to have the 
shutters ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, that 
Ohline breached its agreement when it failed to have the materials 
_ 9 _ 
ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989, that Granite Mill 
was injured by the untimely delivery and that Granite Mill made 
reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages. 
The burden of overturning factual findings f,is a heavy onef 
reflective of the fact that [an appellate court does] not sit to 
retry cases submitted on disputed facts." In re Estate of BartellP 
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). The appellate court gives great 
deference to the trial court's findings, especially when, as here, 
"they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony." 
Id. (citations omitted). To challenge successfully a trial court's 
findings of fact, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 
'clearly erroneous.'" Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987)). Ohline has simply reargued its case by 
recounting a version of the facts most favorable to its position 
while ignoring evidence that supported the trial court's findings. 
That alone is grounds to reject Ohline's challenge to the trial 
court's findings. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.f 817 P.2d 789, 
799 (Utah 1991); Evans ex rel. Evans v. Dotyr 824 P.2d 460, 469 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). When, as here, the appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the reviewing court can assume that the record supports 
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the verdict. Saunder^ v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); 
Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Nevertheless, the trial court's findings were supported by 
substantial evidence. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT OHLINE AGREED 
TO HAVE THE SHUTTERS READY FOR SHIPMENT NO LATER THAN 
JULY ?3, 1999. 
The trial court's findings that Ohline was aware of the 
importance of a firm delivery date and specifically agreed to have 
the shutters ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, were 
supported by substantial evidence. Wayne Hickenlooper of Granite 
Mill testified that he told Chuck Pace of Ohline that Granite Mill 
was "up against an August 4th drop dead deadline" when he 
negotiated the purchase order with Ohline, R. at 144, and again in 
a telephone conversation with Mr. Pace on May 15, 1989, id. at 146-
47, before reinstating the purchase order. On May 17, 1989, Mr. 
Hickenlooper sent Ohline a letter memorializing his May 15, 1989, 
conversation with Chuck Pace of Ohline. The letter said, "Chuck 
Pace stated that the shutters would be ready for shipment by the 
third week in July - 'Hopefully Mid Month'." Ex* 2-P. Chuck Pace 
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testified that that was "exactly what I told Mr- Hickenlooper." R. 
at 111; see also id. at 118-19.3 
Mr. Hickenlooper testified that he understood Ohline to mean 
July 21, 1989, when it said that the shutters would be ready for 
delivery by the third week in July.4 See R. at 139 & 163. The 
trial court, however, took judicial notice of the fact that the end 
of the third week in July was Saturday, July 22, 1989. Id[. at 134-
35. Giving Ohline the benefit of the doubt as to what the parties 
intended by "the third week in July," the trial court concluded 
that Ohline had agreed to have the shutters ready for shipment July 
22, 1989, at the latest. See id. at 78. 
Perhaps the best evidence of the parties' agreement and of 
Ohline's understanding of the importance of the delivery date was 
what Ohline's agent, Chuck Pace, did. Although Mr. Pace testified 
that there was no specific date for delivery of the shutters and 
3
 Moreover, Mr. Pace testified that, sometime after May 22, 
1991, he changed the purchase order to show that the shutters would 
be ready by "Mid July" rather than the original date of July 1, 
1989. R. at 115, 117, 119 & 132; ex. 3-P. 
4
 Gary Sandberg, Granite Mill's president, also testified 
that the parties' agreement was that the shutters would be 
delivered by July 21. Mr. Sandberg visited Ohline around July 10 
to emphasize to Ohline the critical nature of the delivery date. 
Mr. Sandberg testified that Mr. Pace and Ohline's president both 
told him that the shutters would be delivered by July 21. R. at 
211-12. 
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that Ohline never committed to specific dates in its business,5 see 
R. at 96, 98, 217-17A, Mr. Pace, whose responsibilities did not 
include driving a truck and who drove a truck Mon very rare 
occasion11 and then only locally, !£. at 111, 127-28, testified that 
he personally drove a pickup truck with some 86 or 87 shutters from 
Ohline's Gardena, California, office to Las Vegas, Nevada—a four 
and one-half hour drive—on a Saturday afternoon so that Granite 
Mill would have the shutters by Monday morning, i£i. at 103, 128-
29. The trial court properly concluded that Mr. Pace's actions 
spoke louder than his words. See id. at 80-81. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT OHLINE 
BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE MATERIALS READY 
FOR SHIPMENT ON OR BEFORE JULY 22, 1989. 
The trial court's finding that Ohline breached its agreement 
to have the shutters ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989, 
was supported by substantial evidence. The evidence showed that, 
at most, one-third of the shutters were ready for shipment on July 
22, 1989. R. at 103-04 & 176. Another thirty-three units 
(approximately sixty-six shutters) were not shipped until Tuesday, 
July 25, 1989, and the remaining shutters were not shipped until 
6
 The trial court expressly disbelieved Mr. Pace's 
testimony on these points, R. at 78-79, as it was entitled to do. 
See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991) (it is the 
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses). 
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Wednesday, July 26, 1989, and not received until Friday afternoon, 
July 28, 1989, £ge exs. 7-P & 8-P; R. at 105 & 176. That Ohline's 
failure to have the shutters ready for shipment on or before July 
22, 1989, was a material breach is shown by the fact that it cost 
Granite Mill $9,405—about 20 percent of the contract price of 
$45,215.76.* 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT GRANITE MILL 
TOOK REASONABLE STEPS TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
Ohline argues that Granite Mill should have been able to 
install the shutters with only 120 hours of overtime, rather than 
the 435 hours it actually took, and that Granite Mill therefore did 
not reasonably mitigate its damages. Ohline bases this argument on 
the testimony of Scott Colledge, Granite Mill's representative on 
the job site, and simple arithmetic. Mr. Colledge testified that 
he had thirteen men installing shutters. R. at 182-83 & 199. 
Ohline reasons that, with ten days in which to install the shutters 
and with thirteen men available for eight hours per day, Granite 
Mill had 1,040 man hours in which to install the shutters. Mr. 
Colledge further testified that it took approximately 1,160 hours 
to install the shutters. Thus, Ohline concludes, Granite Mill 
6
 The $9,405 was not the total cost to Granite Mill but 
only the premium it had to pay, above its regular hourly rates, for 
the overtime work necessary to install the shutters by August 4, 
1989. See R. at 154-56; ex. 16-D. 
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should have been able to install the shutters with only 120 hours 
of overtime (1,160 hours minus 1,040 hours)* 
The problem with Ohline's argument is not its arithmetic but 
the fact that it is divorced from reality and ignores all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Granite Mill 
reasonably mitigated its damages. 
For example, Ohline assumes that Granite Mill had ten full 
days to install the shutters. In fact, Granite Mill only had at 
roost nine and one-half working days to install the shutters since 
it had to be off the job by noon on August 4, 1989. See R. at 193-
94.7 
More important, Ohline assumes that all the shutters were 
available from the first day of work, and they were not. Although 
Granite Mill received the initial shipment of shutters late on 
Saturday, July 22, it did not receive the bulk of the shutters 
until Friday, July 28, 1989—nearly a week later. Because it did 
not have all of the shutters available when it first began 
installing them, it could not use thirteen men for eight hours a 
day for the entire ten days. In fact, Mr. Colledge testified that 
four men were able to install the first load of shutters beginning 
7
 Ohline's argument also ignores the fact that Granite Mill 
had to install the shutters in time to complete all its other work 
under the contract by noon on August 4, and some of that work could 
not be finished until the shutters were installed. 
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July 24 working straight time, not overtime. R. at 175-76, 182. 
See also id. at 166. 
Ohline also assumes Granite Mill could use thirteen men to 
install shutters for each hour of each working day from July 24 
until August 4. In fact, Mr. Colledge testified that the number of 
men he could use installing shutters on any given day was a product 
of several factors, including the amount of product Granite Mill 
had to work with, the Hilton's schedule, the number of qualified 
men that the union supplied for that day and the space available to 
work in. R. at 201-02 & 205-06. Thirteen was just an average 
number. Id* at 201. Because Granite Mill did not know when it 
would have the shutters to install, it could not effectively use 
thirteen men installing shutters for every hour of every working 
day. Installation of the shutters was just a small part of Granite 
Mill's work on the Hilton. See id. at 158. Granite Mill could not 
put off its other work while it waited for the shutters to arrive 
and still meet its August 4 deadline, and it could not expect 
thirteen people to immediately drop everything they were doing when 
the shutters finally did arrive and work only on installing the 
shutters. 
Similarly, Ohline assumes that it would take the same time to 
install the shutters regardless of when they were delivered. In 
fact, the later the shutters were received, the longer it took to 
install them since Granite Mill had to work around the other work 
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being done on the project. Had all the shutters been on the site 
by July 24, Granite Mill could have installed them as scheduled, 
before the suites were carpeted and furnished. But because the 
second and third deliveries of shutters were late, Granite Mill had 
to use extra men to move furniture out of the rooms before it could 
install the shutters and had to use extra men to replace the 
furniture and clean the carpet and floors after the shutters were 
installed. Id. at 199. Moreover, stacking extra workers in an 
area reduced their productivity because their working space was 
reduced and had to be shared with other workers doing other tasks. 
Id. at 177-78. The longer one worked on the job, the less space 
one had to work in, making it difficult to do the same job with the 
same number of people in the same amount of time. See id, at 199. 
Thus, a job that could be done with thirteen people on Monday could 
not necessarily be done in the same time with thirteen people on 
Friday. 
Finally, Ohline ignores the testimony that Granite Mill worked 
as many regular hours as it could to install the shutters, id. at 
206-07, that it could not have installed the shutters by August 4 
working only regular hours, id. at 177-78, that, when it became 
apparent that Granite Mill could complete the work by its deadline 
without additional overtime, it did not work any more overtime, id. 
at 186, and that it never authorized any overtime that was not 
necessary, id. at 213. From all this evidence, the trial court 
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could reasonably conclude, as Mr. Colledge testified, see id. at 
182 & 206, that, given the late deliveries, Granite Mill could not 
have done anything else to mitigate its damages.11 
V. 
GRANITE MILL WAS ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR THE 
OVERTIME IT PAID. 
Ohline next argues that the trial court erred in concluding 
that Granite Mill was entitled to an offset for the overtime it 
paid. 
Under section 2-717 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer 
who notifies the seller of his intention to do so "may deduct all 
or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of the 
contract from any part of the price still due under the same 
contract." Seg Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990). Thus, if 
Granite Mill was entitled to damages for Ohline's breach of its 
agreement to have the shutters ready for delivery by July 22, 1989, 
• Ohline's suggestion that Granite Mill would have suffered 
the same damages even if it had received all of the shutters on 
July 22, 1989, see Brief of Appellant at 13, suffers from the same 
problems as its failure-to-mitigate argument. Not only does it 
ignore the practicalities of the situation Granite Mill was faced 
with, but it also ignores Mr. Colledge's unequivocal testimony 
that, if all the shutters had been delivered by Friday, July 21, 
1989, they all could have been installed without any overtime work. 
R. at 183-85. 
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then Granite Mill was entitled to offset the amount of its damages 
against the price still owing under the contract,9 
Under section 2-714 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer 
who has accepted goods is entitled to recover as damages "the loss 
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach 
as determined in any manner which is reasonable," including tf[i]n 
a proper case any incidental and consequential damages" recoverable 
under section 2-715. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-714(l) & (3) 
(1990) . 
Incidental damages recoverable under section 2-715 include 
expenses incurred in rejecting the goods, expenses incurred in 
effecting cover and "any other reasonable expense incident to the 
delay or other breach." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715(l). The trial 
court concluded that the overtime Granite Mill was required to pay 
was a "reasonable expense incident to the delay" and therefore 
recoverable as incidental damage under section 70A-2-715(l). See 
R. at 82. As the trial court correctly noted, section 70A-2-715(l) 
does not require that the seller have notice of the importance of 
that particular element of damage before the trial court can award 
(or offset) it. Id. 
9
 Ohline does not claim that Granite Mill failed to notify 
Ohline of its intention to deduct its damages from the purchase 
price, and in fact Granite Mill gave Ohline timely notice that it 
was deducting its damages. See ex. 16-D. 
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Ohline argues that overtime incurred as a result of a late 
delivery of goods cannot be incidental damages under section 2-
715(1) but must be consequential damages under section 2-715(2)• 
Subsection (2) allows a buyer to recover as consequential damages 
resulting from the seller's breach of contract "any loss resulting 
from general or particular requirements and needs of which the 
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-715(2) . Ohline further argues that Granite Mill 
was not entitled to offset or recover the overtime as consequential 
damages because Ohline did not have reason to know of Granite 
Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline at the time of contracting.10 
Whether a particular element of damage is considered "loss 
resulting in the ordinary course of events" under section 2-714, 
incidental damages under section 2-715(1) or consequential damages 
under section 2-715(2) is not always clear; the categories tend to 
overlap. See 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code § 10-4 at 512, 514 & 519 & n.33 (3d ed. 1988). 
CQinpare Jay y. gjmmernan CQ. y, general Mills, IVQf, 327 F. Supp. 
1198f 1205 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (cost of overtime paid to third party in 
effecting cover was recoverable as "incidental damages"), with 
10
 Ohline does not claim that the overtime could reasonably 
have been prevented, except to the extent that it has argued that 
Granite Mill did not reasonably mitigate its damages, an argument 
addressed in part IV, supra. 
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Kabco Equip, Specialists v. Budgetel. Inc., 440 N.E.2d 611, 614 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (overtime conceivably recoverable as 
consequential damages)• As the trial court noted, Granite Mill's 
claimed offset seemed to fit within the last phrase of section 70A-
2-715(1)—"any other reasonable expense incident to the delay•" 
See R. at 82. But whether or not the overtime Granite Mill 
incurred was properly considered incidental damages, as the trial 
court concluded, or consequential damages, as Ohline argues, is 
irrelevant since Granite Mill's claim met the requirements for both 
incidental and consequential damages. 
This court should affirm the trial court's ruling if it can do 
so on any legal theory apparent on the record, even if the trial 
court assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling. Allphin Realty. 
Inc. v. Siner 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979); Goodsel v. Department 
of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974). Even if 
the trial court erred in considering Granite Mill's claim as one 
for incidental damages rather than consequential damages, the trial 
court correctly concluded that Granite Mill was entitled to an 
offset. The only distinction Ohline relies on between incidental 
and consequential damages is that consequential damages must be 
foreseeable, and the trial court expressly found that Ohline was 
aware of Granite Mill's time requirements and of the importance of 
the delivery date when it agreed to have the shutters ready for 
delivery by July 22, 1989. R. at 80-82. Although Ohline claimed 
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that it had no notice of Granite Mill's August 4 deadline, it 
concedes that the record on this point "is in dispute." Brief of 
Appellant at 12. The trial court's finding that Ohline had notice 
of the time constraints Granite Mill was working under was 
supported by substantial evidence.11 For example, Wayne 
Hickenlooper testified that, when he negotiated the purchase order 
with Ohline on behalf of Granite Mill, he discussed with Chuck Pace 
that Granite Mill was "up against an August 4th drop dead 
deadline." R. at 144. He further testified that between April and 
June 1989 he had "[w]ell over a dozen" conversations with Chuck 
Pace and that he discussed the August 4 deadline in at least half 
of those conversations, including in a telephone conversation on 
May 15, 1989, before Granite Mill reinstated its order. Id. at 
145-47. 
The trial court further found that Mr. Pace's actions in 
personally driving a pickup truck full of shutters from California 
to Nevada on a Saturday afternoon showed that Ohline "was aware of 
not only the importance of the date, the very last date, the third 
week in July, but also of the defendant's obligation to have the 
work completed by August 4." Id. at 80. 
11
 Moreover, the court could assume that the trial court's 
finding was supported by substantial evidence since Ohline has not 
marshaled the evidence in support of that finding. See, e.g., 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
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Because the record fully supports the trial court's conclusion 
that Ohline had notice of Granite Mill's time requirements, Granite 
Mill was entitled to an offset for the overhead it incurred, 
regardless of whether that offset was properly considered 
incidental or consequential damages. 
VI. 
OHLINE'S CLAIM THAT GRANITE MILL'S ACTIONS EXCUSED ITS 
UNTIMELY DELIVERY WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
Finally, Ohline argues that Granite Mill caused any delay in 
shipment by cancelling its initial order of May 5, 1989, and not 
providing Ohline with final dimensions until June 6, 1989, and that 
Granite Mill should therefore have been denied an offset. 
Ohline did not make this argument to the trial court, see R. 
at 88-90 & 219-24, but raises it for the first time on appeal. 
Issues not timely raised in the trial court are deemed waived on 
appeal, and the appellate court is precluded from considering their 
merits. See LeBaron & Assocs.f Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.. 823 
P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and cases cited therein. For 
an issue to be sufficiently raised in the trial court, "it must at 
least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial 
judge can consider it." Id. (quoting James v. Prestonr 746 P.2d 
799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Ohline's trial counsel made no 
argument to the district court on this issue, cited no legal 
authority on this issue, did not request findings on the issue and 
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did not object to the trial court's failure to make express 
findings on the issue. That alone is reason to reject the 
argument. See id. 
Moreover, the argument is not supported by the record. The 
only evidence on this issue was Chuck Pace's testimony on rebuttal 
that, if Ohline had received the final dimensions on May 22, 1989, 
it could have had the shutters ready for delivery by July 21, 1989. 
See R. at 217A. There was no evidence that the parties ever agreed 
that Granite Mill would supply the final measurements on May 22, 
1989, or even before June 6, 1989, nor was there any evidence that 
Ohline7s agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment by the 
third week in July was conditioned in any way on Granite Mill's 
providing final measurements before June 6. Even after Granite 
Mill cancelled its first order, Ohline agreed that it would have 
the shutters ready for shipment by the third week in July at the 
latest. See exs. 2-P & 17-D; R. at 138-39 & 146-47. Ohline knew 
at the time that it had not yet received the final measurements. 
Even after Ohline received the final measurements, it never claimed 
that it could not meet the July deadline. Instead, it confirmed 
its prior agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment by the 
third week in July.12 In fact, when Gary Sandberg, Granite Mill's 
12
 In fact, Ohline's Shutter Production Order, see ex. 9-P, 
gave the estimated shipping date as July 17, 1989. The order was 
dated June 5, 1989. Mr. Pace testified that the production order 
was not generated until Ohline had received the final working 
- 24 -
president, visited Ohline's offices the second week in July, both 
Chuck Pace and Ohline's president assured him that the shutters 
would be delivered by July 21, 1989. R. at 212. Because there is 
no basis for Ohline's belated argument that Granite Mill was 
somehow responsible for the late deliveries, the court should 
reject that argument, even if Ohline has not waived it. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous 
and support the trial court's conclusion that Granite Mill was 
entitled to an offset for the overtime it had to pay as a result of 
Ohline's untimely delivery of the shutters. The judgment of the 
trial court should therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this ^** day of May, 1992. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
BRUCE T. JONES, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
(Original signature) 
measurements. R. at 218. But even if Ohline had not received the 
final measurements when it gave Granite Mill the estimated shipping 
date of July 17, it knew at the time that it had not received the 
final measurements and still thought it could complete the job by 
July 17, well ahead of the July 22 deadline. See id. at 101, 112 
& 217A-18. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OHLINE CORPORATION, a ] 
California corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
GRANITE MILL, a Utah \ 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
• CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 900905549 CV 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter was tried before the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding, sitting without 
a jury, on September 20, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by Gerald 
M. Conder, Esq. and defendant was represented by Bruce T. Jones, 
Esq. Having heard the evidence and reviewed the exhibits, the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At all relevant times, plaintiff was a corporation 
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
DFC 3 0 199! 
California and defendant was a corporation duly organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. On or about April 25, 1989, defendant entered into 
an agreement with the Las Vegas Hilton Corporation (the "Hilton 
Contract") regarding the remodeling of certain portions of the Las 
Vegas Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada (the "Project"). Article 
IV of the Hilton Contract required completion of the work on or 
before August 4, 1989. 
3. In order to meet the required completion date in the 
Hilton Contract of August 4, 1989, the defendant determined it 
necessary to have all materials received or ready for shipment 
sufficiently prior to such date in order to allow the materials to 
be installed and the work completed on or before August 4, 1989. 
4. In furtherance of the Hilton Contract, the defendant 
issued Purchase Order No. 2903 (the "Purchase Order") in early May, 
1989, respecting the manufacture and delivery of materials in 
connection with the Project. In regard to the required completion 
date, the Purchase Order contained certain conditions which 
provided, in relevant part: 
"#3 finish samples will be sent the week of 
5-8-89 
#4 must be ready for pick-up 7-1-89" 
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5. After issuance of the Purchase Order, plaintiff 
required as a term thereof that defendant comply with certain 
credit and payment requirements of plaintiff. 
6. After agreement respecting credit and payment terms, 
on or about May 17, 1989, defendant reissued Purchase Order No. 
2903, together with a check in the amount of $11,3 03.94 noting that 
it was a deposit on "P.O. 2903 as agreed." The Purchase Order and 
check were sent to plaintiff under cover of a letter dated May 17, 
1989 from defendant which provided, in relevant part: 
I have enclosed our check for the initial 25% 
deposit as we agreed yesterday. 
Chuck Pace stated that the shutters would be 
ready for shipment by the third week in July— 
"Hopefully Mid-Month." 
7. After receipt of the Purchase Order, check and letter 
dated May 17, 1989, plaintiff issued Shutter Production Order No. 
106127, dated June 5, 1989 (the "Shutter Production Order"), 
respecting the Purchase Order and itemizing the materials to be 
manufactured for the Project. The Shutter Production Order noted 
an estimated shipping date of July 17, 1989. 
8. In connection with the Hilton Contract, the Purchase 
Order and the Shutter Production Order, the plaintiff and defendant 
also had communications wherein the parties understood and agreed 
that the materials to be furnished by plaintiff were to be finished 
and ready for shipment no later than the last day of the third week 
of July, or July 22, 1989. 
9. As a consequence of the completion date in the Hilton 
Contract, and as evidenced by the Purchase Order, the Shutter 
Production Order and the communication between the parties, the date 
the materials were to be ready for shipment was understood to be 
very important to defendant and guaranteed by plaintiff. 
10. Having received the Purchase Order, the letter from 
defendant dated May 17, 1989, and having understood and agreed to 
have the materials ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, 
the plaintiff at no time responded that this was not correct, but 
confirmed the agreement pursuant to the Shutter Production Order. 
11. Time was of the essence in the performance of the 
agreement between the parties and the agreement by plaintiff to have 
the materials ready for shipment by no later than July 22, 1989 was 
a specific and material term of the agreement relied upon by 
defendant. 
12. The awareness and agreement of plaintiff to have the 
materials ready for shipment by no later than July 22, 1989, is 
evidenced by the delivery of a portion of the materials in a pickup 
truck loaded and driven by Mr. Chuck Pace (an employee and sales 
representative of plaintiff not typically charged with such duties) , 
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00061 
from California to Las Vegas, Nevada so that delivery of this first 
shipment of the goods could be there by the evening of Saturday, 
July 22, 1989. 
13. If the materials manufactured by plaintiff for the 
Project had been ready for shipment on the agreed date of July 22, 
1989, defendant could have installed the materials and completed its 
work at the Project on or before August 4, 1989 without the 
utilization of overtime labor. 
14. The materials manufactured by the plaintiff which 
were agreed to be ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, 
were actually ready for shipment and shipped by plaintiff on various 
dates commencing with the pickup truck driven by Mr. Pace, but with 
a majority of the materials ready for shipment and shipped later the 
following week subsequent to July 22, 1989. 
15. Plaintiff invoiced defendant a total of $45,328.62 
for all materials delivered to the Project pursuant to the Purchase 
Order. Defendant timely paid all of this amount with the exception 
of $9,405.00, which was the amount of a credit memo issued by 
defendant August 18, 1989 as a result of the late performance of 
plaintiff. 
16. The defendant was diligent and made reasonable 
efforts to mitigate the overtime labor and other incidental damages 
incurred as a result of the late performance of plaintiff. 
17. The incidental damages incurred by defendant as a 
result of the failure of plaintiff to have the materials ready for 
shipment no later than July 22, 1989, as agreed, were $9,405.00, an 
amount equal to or in excess of all amounts then otherwise owed by 
defendant to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. A specific and material term of the agreement between 
the parties relied upon by defendant was that the materials subject 
to the Purchase Order to be manufactured by the plaintiff were to 
be ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989. 
2. The understanding, intent and agreement of the 
parties with respect to the materials was that the plaintiff 
guaranteed the materials would be ready for shipment, not merely 
completed or nearly completed, but on trucks and in the process of 
shipment, no later than July 22, 1989. 
3. Plaintiff breached the agreement when it failed to 
have the materials ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989. 
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4. Plaintiff had notice, and was aware, of the agreement 
between the parties to have the materials ready for shipment no 
later than July 22, 1989, and the reliance of the defendant thereon. 
5. The measure of damages for plaintiff's breach is the 
incidental damages under § 70A-2-715 Utah Code Ann, resulting from 
a plaintiff's breach and including "Any other reasonable expenses 
incident to the delay." The damages in this instance were 
incidental to the delay of plaintiff in breach of the agreement 
between the parties to have the materials ready for shipment on or 
before July 22, 1989. 
6. The defendant showed appropriate diligence in 
mitigating damages and was reasonable in its payment of overtime in 
order to complete the installation of the materials and its work at 
the Project under the Hilton Contract on or before Aucjust 4, 1989. 
The incidental damages incurred by defendant resulting from the 
breach by plaintiff were $9,405.00, an amount equal to or in excess 
of all amounts otherwise owed by defendant to plaintiff. 
DATED this S ^ day of /^uL^j^iA^jLMt^l991. 
BY/THE COURT: 
M A ^ = 
/ /Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
I District Judge 
^-.-AT'TEST-^-
By Jll. . 
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